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SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
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S/CT FOR S. GAIL ROBERTSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [PTER](#) [ECON](#) [ASEC](#) [PREL](#) [ETTC](#) [TU](#)
SUBJECT: TURKEY: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT

REF: STATE 6461

¶1. (SBU) A strict reading of the criteria outlined in reftel paras 2 and 8 could lead to the conclusion that Turkey does not possess critical infrastructure (CI) or key resources (KR) whose incapacity or destruction would have a "debilitating impact on (U.S.) security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters." However, there are several key elements of infrastructure that are relevant to note in this context.

¶2. (SBU) Turkey has two pieces of critical infrastructure through which seven percent of the world's oil supply moves each day:

- 1) The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline carries up to 1 million barrels of oil a day; the terminal at Ceyhan has a holding capacity of 300,00 tons of crude.
- 2) The Turkish Straits, comprised of the Strait of Canakkale (Dardanelles), the Sea of Marmara and the Istanbul Strait (Bosphorous) are among the most hazardous, crowded, difficult and potentially dangerous natural waterways in the world. Ships carrying 137 million metric tons of petroleum products, including 95 million metric tons of crude oil, transit the straits every year.

The closure or disruption of either of these critical infrastructures would impede the flow of significant amounts of crude oil to world markets.

¶3. (SBU) Separately, Habur Border Gate is the primary Turkey-Iraq border crossing point. Approximately 3 million gallons per day of gasoline and diesel fuel for the Iraqi people and 25 percent of the sustainment fuel for coalition forces cross into Iraq through Habur Border Gate. Incapacity or destruction of Habur Border Gate would impact U.S. national security interests by degrading our military and humanitarian efforts in Iraq.

¶4. (SBU) While reftel para 10 excludes from this report "war fighting facilities managed by other agencies," we note that Incirlik Air Force Base is a major air cargo hub supporting operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Over 50% of air cargo into Iraq transits Incirlik. Up to ten KC-135 tanker aircraft based at Incirlik support refueling operations for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, have run over 2800 refueling sorties and have delivered over 192 million pounds of fuel. The incapacity or destruction of Incirlik would have a significant short-term effect on coalition operations in Iraq and, thus, on U.S. national interests.

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